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CONTRACT, TRUST, AND RESISTANCE
IN THE SECOND TREATISE
RORY J . CONCES

I: Introduction
If there is a single problem that has dominated political thought
for the past four hundred years, it is the tension within the body
politic between the will of the collective, as it is expressed by
those vested with authority and power, and the will of the individual. Among political theorists who have examined this problem, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke viewed this potentially
ruinous tension in radically different ways. In his Leviarhan,
Hobbes presents the problem of how we are to conduct ourselves as a society, an apparent dilemma whose horns are anarchy and servile absolutism. Either we submit to the constraints
imposed upon us by government, or we accept the dire consequences of his infamous state of nature. Since he was well
acquainted with the strife of a war-torn Europe (including the
Thirty Years' War (1618-48] in Central Europe and the first
Civil War ( 1642-46) in England), the choice was an easy one
for Hobbes. He leaves no doubt that the dissolution of government is the single worst misfortune, resulting in a condition in
which 'the li fe of man, [is] solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and
short'.' It is therefore to man's advantage to leave this state, by
accepting absolute sovereignty as the only rational alternative.
Like Hobbes, Locke witnessed the turmoil of his age. Yet he
did not advocate authoritarian rule. Rather, he is known as a
champion of liberty, natural rights, and consent as the only basis

1 Thomas

Hobbes. Leviathan , ed. C. }.facpherson (Harmondswonh 1975). ch.

13, para. 8.
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of political society and government. Although an ardent believer
in law and order, Locke was aware that an inordinate fear of
anarchy cou ld e ventually lead to an overly intrus ive or oppressive state, the hallmark of which would be the diminution of
individuals' liberties. Not wishing to compromise the moral
inviolability of persons, Locke sought to protect liberties by
arguing for what has been called the 'liberal state'. To what
extent Locke's state can be c haracterized a s the minimal or
'night-watc hman' state of classica l liberal political theory is
open to debate,l but his liberal posture is shown by his
·emphasis on conslitutionalism, that is, the insistence on political
guarantees for the maintenance of individual liberties' .3 Locke
recognized, however, that no judic ial mechanism could guarantee the liberties of individuals, that it would always be possible
for the state apparatus to circumve nt or undermine any protecti ve measure. and so he advocated a 'revolutionary liberalism' in
which resistance to governmental authority could be undertaken
2 For a discussion of 1hc night-watchman state, see R. Noiick, Anarchy, Stott,

a11d 11wpiu (New York 1974), pp. 26,-7 and J. Paul (ed:), Reading No,Jck: ~ays on
'Anar,:hy, S111te, and utopia ' (Tocowa, NJ 1981). No1o1ck, a hbe~nan, _re,,1ves !he
Locki.an claim that •a minimal state, limi1ed 10 the narrow functK>ns 01 protecllon
again$t force, 1he(1, fraud, enforcement of _contracts, and so on, is juS1ified;. th~ any
more ex1ensive stale will violate persons· rights not to be forced to do certain t.hmgs,
aod is unjustified; and that the 1ninimal state is inspiring as well as right' (p. ix). ll is
wonh noting, as Manin Seliger has done in Tht liberal polltlcJ of John wd<e
(LOn<lon J968), pp. 18-20, chat 1he throry and practice of libera_lisn1 has a~ually
(..died for s1toilg government rather than the ·minimafol' state that LS often au~t,uted
to it. 11,is becomes cspccially clear when we oonsidet how the hotly debated 'hberal'
plan (or universal hcahh insurance coverage in the USA is to be implemented.
l Seliger. op. cit.. p. 2 1. h is impor1Mt to note that some con1tmPora.ry communitarians frequentJy criticize rights-based liberalism for an undue emphasLs upon
individual liberties and a corresponding neglect of the community. They make the
case that the mc.mbcrs.hip of a community is panl)' defined by the community they
inhabit. See. for example, S. Avineri & A. De~Shalit (eds), Communitarianism and
i11dividualism (Oxford 1992); S. Mulhall & A. Swift, Lit,e.rals and communito.rfons
(Oxford 1992); and M. J. Sandel, U~uclism and the Um/IS of justice (Cambridge

1982).

without fear of tearing apart the fabric of society and without
fear of moral impropriety , particularly since resistance becomes
legitimized once all avenues of legal recourse have been
exhausted. There is little doubt that Locke took the evils of
rebellion to be an acceptable ris k in the event that a ruler
betrayed the trust reposed in him by his subjects.•
But why did Locke allow for the possibility of resistance
knowing that it could lead to a state of anarchy? Why was such
a risky venture found acceptable by Locke? Why did he think
that anarchy and authoritarian rule did not exhaust the possibilities, thereby allowing him to escape through the horns of the
Hobbesian dilemma? The reasons lie principally in his umbrella
concept of consent, which underwrites his doctrine of resistance,
as well as his confidence that the integrity of the community can
be maintained even in the absence of authoritarian rule. More
specifically, his notion of consent, which seems to cover 'all
instances of deliberate, voluntary alienation of rights (and
undertakings of obligations)' ,s reflects an understanding of
institutions which distinguishes the dissolution of government
from the dissolution of political society. Although a quick
reading of the Second Treatise might leave the impression that
political society and government form an amalgam, created by a
single consensual agreement made by those individuals who
have decided to leave the state of nature, such a reading would
mean that political society and government are coterminous.6
"' II has been argued lha1 Locke·s ponrayal of the state as a potential aggressor is
prcmimd on his notion or libeny or negative freedom. for example, S. L. Newman,
' l..ockc·s 1\\-'0 t~otis<:s and «>mcmporary thought', in Joh11 UJcke'J Tho Jnatis<s of
g<n·t:mm1;111: New foterpretations, ed. E. J. Harpham (Lawren~ 1992), p. 180.

5 A. J. Simmons . Or, 1he ~.dge Qf curarchy: Locke. mnJ.t!n.t, an.d lhl! limilS of
sodety (Princeton 1993), p. 69.
0

John Locke, Th<> treClli~·ts of gowmmelll, ed. P. Laslen (Cambridge 1960).
10 1he Sec.ond Treatise are given by ·11· foUowod by a sea.ion number

Rererences

(e.g., 11 . 4),
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Not only would the integrity of the community be in jeopardy, if
the initial consent were abrogated for want of a new leader, but
the liberties a nd interests of the individual members of the community would be at risk as well. But by asserting that these
institutions are nnt one and the same, and that there is a plurality
of agreements tha t create political society and government,
Locke seems to have acknowledged an institutional logic that
allowed for the dissolution of government without compromising
the integrity of political society. In other words, Locke's view
satisfies what may be called the integrity condition. Such a line
of thought seems, however, from the perspective of the individual members of the community, to allow for nothing short of
rebellion to safeguard their liberties and interests from a tyrant.
Locke did not, however, merely adopt a Dual-Consent (D-C)
Theory of politica l society a nd government, for the institutional
logic amounted to more than simply calling for separate consensual agreements of the same ki nd. Some sort of institutional
arrangement o r practice was needed to acknowledge the moral
inviolability of the individuals of the community, and to serve as
notice to the sovereign that his actions would be met with legitimate resistance if he did not meet certain standards of performance. It had 10 meet what may be called the moral inviolability
condition. To this end Locke employed a Contract-Trust (C-T)
Theory-shown by the fact that the Second Treatise teems with
the words 'contract' and ' trust' -in which a contract brings
about the onset of political society and a trust establishes
government. It is cruc ial to note that what distinguishes trust
from contract, according to Locke's view, is that trust is a consensual agreement between the people and the ruler which allocates rights and obligations in a way that favours the individual
members of the community. Characteristic of trust, then, is this
mora l bias towards those who are ru led. This paper exam ines
the grounds for interpreting this theory as one that, in meeting

the conditions of integrity and moral inviolability, allows Locke
to escape throug h the horns of the Hobbesian dilemma.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Part II gives an
account of Locke's state of nature and the origin of political
society; Pan Ill of various questionable views regarding Locke's
treatment of the consensual foundations of political society and
government, as well as the C-T Theory. Part IV then offers the
C-T Theory, with regard to some of the literature on the Second
Treatise, as a view that accords well with the conditions of
integrity and moral inviolability as understood within Locke's
doctrine of resistance.

II: The State of Nature and the Origin of Political Society
To appreciate Locke's attempt to justify resistance within his liberal framework, we need to delineate what is political and what
is not. Understanding the state of nature and the origin and
j ustification of political socie1y is thus essential for understanding Locke's idea of the bounda ries of political authority. The
state of nature is, as A. J. Simmons has shown, a relational concept in so far as a person, A, is in a State of nature with respect
to another person, B, if and only if A has not voluntarily agreed
co become a member of (or is no longer a member of) a legitimate political society of which B is a me mber.7 It not only
refers to a State of affairs in which pre-political persons e xisted,
but also refers to a p~t-political state, like that which results
from civil war or tyranny.8 Much of Locke's early discussion of
the state of nature seems to refer to the pre-political person,
though it is not difficult to imag ine it referring to the post-

1

Simmons, op. cit., p. 21.

• A. J. Simrnons, 77,e U.x:ktu11 tlr~ory of rigJus (Prinocton 1992), p. t29.
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political person as well. ln c hapte rs 2-5 of the Second Treatise,
Locke portrays the state of nature as the 'State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a Stare of perjec1 Freedom to order their
Actions. and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they
think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking
leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man' (II. 4). It
is not a state of licence, but rather of natural liberty in which the
law of nature is the sole guide that prohibits persons from interfering with the property (taken in a very broad sense to include
life, liberty, and property as we understand it today) of another
except in cases in which the law of nature is transgressed (11. 6
and 87). And since Locke took this law to be a law of reason or
' principle of conduct', he also took it to be part of man's
nalUre.9
Rationality, however, is neither man 's only characteristic nor
the most influential one when it comes to life in the slate of
nature. Affective responses, like self-love and revenge, show
that men ofte n refuse the guiding light of the law of nature by
being partial in their j udgements and violent in their punishment.
Indeed, our being rational creatures does not mean that we do
not get in each other's way. This led Locke to make the strong
c laim that the greater part of mankind does not strictly observe
equality and j ustice (11. 123).
Although Locke begins with a description of a tranquil, idyllic state of nature, this is by no means the situation that prompts
men to join together to form a community. Indeed, why would
anyone want to quit such a peaceful way of life for one full of
anxiety, deceit, and violence? Rather, what compels people to
j oin together to form a community is the fact that not everyone
respects the rights of other people, which e ventually transforms
this idyllic state into something resembling the Hobbesian state
of war. Although it is a state of natural liberty, it is also a state
0

in which some transgress the law of nature and place themselves
in a state of war with others. As Locke put it, '[H]e who
attempts to get another Man into his Absolute Power, does
thereby pu1 himself imo a State of War with him; It being to be
understood as a Declaration of a Design upon his Life' (11. 17).
It is they, the transgressors of this law, who follow the rule of
force and violence rather than the rule of reason (11. 16).10 In
orde r to preserve property, in the broad sense of the term, and
to punish those who act contrary to this end, men recognize that
they must consolidate their power and move from a condition in
which they have natural liberty and follow the law of nature, to
one in which they have civil liberty and are governed by standing laws (II. 22). In other words, they recognize the need to
form political society, and hence they give their consent to its
10 There, arc other in1erpre1a1ions or Loc-ke's state of nature. ln Ltx.·k~ on """'' and
p«uce (Oxford 1960). pp. 45-105, R. H. Cox ariuos 1ha1 the Second Trea1ise offers
1wo variations of the s1a1e of nature: an e.arly one (SON ·E) alld a late one (SON·L).

SON-E ttfel"$ 10 the pris.tine condition of man prior to political societ)' and political
power, whereas SON•L refers to the state of affairs in which political power has been
parcelled out to individuals in order to erect a new po1ity. In 04her words, SON-6 is a
state of peace. whereas SON·L is a state or disorder.
According 10 an0thcr view, however, Lo<:ke's sr.uc or nature is not a ·go\'etome,n1less phlkSe' in 1he developme<u of political society, bu1 rather an imerpretath·e
1001 10 illus1ra1e the fundamental rights of men as well as a description of a situation
1ha1 obtains belwt?Ctt stales and belw"n individuals. Set Stliger, op. cit., pp. 82-4.
Silllilatly, Joh1l Dullll, in TIie poli1ica/ 1!,okJ;hl of Jolm lock~: An his,orical account
of 1/f<'. 11rgumenr of the 'TW<., trCiltiS('..$ ofgowrnmenr' (Cambridge 1969), contends that

'the sca1c of nature. that state tha1 "all Men are naturally in'", is noc an asocial condition but :m shiSlorical condition. h ii that state in which men are set by God. The
state of nature is a topic for theological reflection, not for anthropological research'
Cp. 97).
And s1ill othets tal<e the view 1ha1 it is plausible 10 consider 1he hi$10ticity of

Locke's state of nature. Simmons. for example. says so: 'There is, then, no
inconsistency or confusion involved in Locke's using the state of nature sometimes as
an analytical device (10 explain and discuss 1he nature of the political relationship),
sometimes to describe a historical condition of people, sometimes 10 desc-ribe a moral
or social condi1ion ol possible or conternporaty persons. All are perfectly proper
applicaiions of 1he ooncepf (On 1h< edge ofanarchy, p. 23).

L. J. Mac:foJ'lat1e. Modem political 1J:eO?' (New Yott 1973), p. 8.
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formation. This line of thinking is summarized as follows by
Locke:
[T]herc, and there only is Political Society, where every one of the Members hath quitted this natural Power, resig.n'd it up into the hands of the

Communi1y in all cases thal exclude him not from appealing for Protection to 1he Law es1ablished by ii. And thus all private judgemenl of every
par1icular Member being excluded, the Community comes to be Umpire,
by seuled standing Rules, indifferent, and 1he same 10 all Parties; and by
Men having Aulhority from the Community, for the execution or those
Rules, decides all the differences 1hat may happen between any Members
of thal Society, concerning any mauer of right: and punishes 1hose
Offences, which any Member ha1h commiued against the Sociely, wi1h
such Penalties as the Law has established: Whereby it is easie to discern
who are, and who are not, in Politlcal Sociery together. Those who are

united into one Body, and have a common cstablish'd Law and Judicature
appeal to, with Au1hority 10 decide Controversies between them, and
punish Offenders, are i11 Civil Society one with another: but those who
have no such common Appeal, I mean on Earth, a.re still in the state of
Nature, each being, where there is no other, Judge for himself, and
Executioner: which is. as I have before shew'd it, the perfect state of

10

Na,ure. (II. 87)

The community that is formed seems to be a response to the
darker side of man's nature. Precisely for this reason political
society is the most efficient and enduring means by which the
more productive side of human nature ca n be nurtured. A relatively secure social environment is the result of the initial consent.

Ill: Consensual Foundations of Political Society and Government
Is the initial consent restricted 10 the formation of political
society or does it establish government as well? This is an
extremely important question, for the answer will tell us if
Locke's doctrine of resistance is compatible with the integrity of
124

the com munil)' . At first glance, this compatibility seems to be in
jeopardy. The difficulty stems in part from the fact that Locke
sometimes writes as though he collapses the distinction between
society and government. If so, Locke's doctrine of resistance
could be viewed, and rightly so, as being antagonistic to the
integrity of the community. This is not surprising, given Locke's
shifting use of language. As Grant indicates, one of the ways in
which Locke uses the word 'government'-designated here by
·governmem 1'-suggests that political society coexists with
government 1: Whenever people come together to preserve their
property by creating a community, they must have also created
government, .11 The former cannot exist without the latter, and
vice versa. Take, for instance, II. 87 cited above. Locke not
only suggests that political society is an institution in which the
natural powers of each individual are consolidated by a single
consent, but he also suggests that this union brings about some
sort of governing apparatus associated with the rule of law (supporting what I call the Single-Consent [S-C] Theory of political
society and government). More specifically, the consent of each
member empowers the majority 10 act as the governing body of
rhe commu nil)' . Majority rule is a feature of the onset of political society, inherent in its genetic structure. Again , in a familiar
but telling passage, Locke says:
Whosoever therefore out or a state or Nature unite into a Community,
must be underslood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for
which they uni le into Society, to the majority of the Community, unless
1hey expressly agreed in any number grealer than the majorily. And this
is done by barely agreeing to 1111ite into 011e Political Society, which is all
1he Compact thal is, or needs be, between Lhe Individuals, that enter into,
or make up a Common-wealth. And thus that, which begins and actually
constitutes a11y Political Society, is nothing but the consent or any number
or Freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorp0rate into such a

11 R. W. Gra111, Jo)m U x:kt's libtrulism (Chic:i..go 1987), p. 103.
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Socie1y. And 1his is lhat, and thal only, which did , or could give
begi1111ing 10 any lawful Govemmem in the World. (II. 99)
The two passages quoted at length (11. 87 and 99) wgether give
reason to think that the consenting individuals agree to whatever
decisions and policies may be arrived at by a majority of the
community . Indeed, the decrees of the majority seem to constitutc the 'ru le of government,' as they are employed in the act
of forming society (II. 132). With a single consensual agreement
bringing some individuals out of the state of nature and under
legitimate authority, Locke seems to highlight a sort of democracy that is basic to political society, thereby linking political
society with govern ment, in such a way that the former cannot
exist without the latter and vice versa.12 The implication of
rebellion, however, undermines the integrity condition, for once
the members resist the authority of government1, thereby nul1ifying the initial consent , not only would the legitimate
government, cease to exist. but pol itical society would cease to
exist as wel l. The result would be a return to the state of nature
(i f not a state of war).13
The common origin of political society and government
seems to have dealt a fatal blow to the claim that Locke's doctrine of resistance is compatible with the integrity condition.
However, I believe they can be understood to be compatible, if
only we focus on the other sense of the word 'government' that
Grant attributes to Locke, here designated by 'governmenti' . If
government2 means a designated f orm that is set up by the
majority to be the trustee for the legislative and executive
powers of the collective in an attempt to preserve property , then
u Ibid.. p. 104. In addition, ·Whenever the StJCit'.f)' is dissoNed, 'tis certain lhe
Governmenl 0( 1ha1 Society cannot remain' (II. 21 1).

it is correct for Grant to argue that political society has a
temporal and theoretical priority over government2. It is temporally prior in so far as the 'Co11sritwio11 of the Legislative is the
first and fundamental Act of Socicty'(II. 212), and it is theoretically prior in so far as government can be construed as 'an
instrument of the society for the preservation of the society'. 14
Consequently, once we acknowledge the priority of political
society, we must also acknowledge that any attempt "ro assert an
existential linkage between the two (that is, that the existence of
political society presumes the existence of government and vice
versa) is bound to fail. Arguing for the priority of political
society suggests, 1hen, that political socie1y can exist, at least for
the time being, without government2. The implication of this is
significant, for it means that Locke' s doctrine of resistance is not
necessarily antagonistic to society. Although withdrawal of the
consent that creates government2, in the event that government2
is remiss in its obligation to protect the property rights of the
people, may result in some disorder, it does not necessarily lead
to the dissolution of society. lndeed, the majority of society,
who initially formed government2, may establish a new
government2,. To put it in Locke's own words:
[T]he Community may make compounded and mixed Forms of Government, ilS they think good. And if the Legislative Power be at first given
by the Majority 10 one or more Persons only for their Lives, or any
limiled Lime, and 1hen the Supream Power to revert to them again; when

it is so reverted, 1he Community may dispose of it again anew into what
hands they please, and so constitute a new Form of Government. (II. 132)
The integrity of the community can thus be maintained by focusing on the second sense of government, a sense which allows
Locke to distinguish the origin and dissolution of political

u In On the• etlg~ ,if u!furd,y, Simmons notes lhn.t 'the state of war is certainly not
roe.1tt<11Sfrt' wil.h the $.late of ,,~wre:, ho"evtr, evm if it is nmsi~''""' with it' (p. 43).
'" Gra1u, op. c:i1.. p. 104.
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society from thal of government Is
This is nol, of course, 10 say that Locke advocated a DualConsent (D-C) Theory as was discussed above, for simply to say
that one consent establishes political society and another sets up
government is to disregard Locke's use of C(lrtain words indicative of liberalism and i1s allocation of rights and obligations that
favour the individual.16 More specifically, it neglects lhe fact
1hat Locke delineates two sorlS of consensual agreement that are
associated with different institutions: that is, 'contract' is associ-

ated with the founding of political society and 'trust' is associated wi1h the setting-up of government. This amounts to Locke
endorsing a Contract-Trust (C-T) Theory of political society and
government, which is compatible with 1he integrity condition as
well as the moral inviolability condition. It is to this view that I
now Lum.

is Ibid. Frederick Pollock holds lhis view when he state$ that 'Locke ... is at no
small pains 10 show that the dissolution of government is to be di.stingui.shed from that
oi societies. .. Where the society is dissolved, the government cannot remain"; but
govemrnen1s may be altered or dissolved frorn within, and the society not be
destroyed' (A,1 introducrimr to 1he hb,1ory of 1he $de.nu tf politics (London L96L ), p.

the understanding that some fonn of political organization will be necessary for its
proper functlOning-"'the beginnilt11, of Polirid:. Society depends upon the consent of
the Individuals, 10 joyn into and make one Society; who, when they are thus
incorpora1td, might SCI up what fonn of GO\'Cmment !hey thoug.hl fit"' (II. 106r (op.
ci,., p. 226).

To find references to 1he C-T Theory in the literature on the
Second Treatise, we need look no further than J. W. Gough's
The social contract and his John Locke's political philosophy,
and A. J. Simmons's more recent work, 011 the edge of anarchy: Locke, co11se111, and the limits ofsociery.
Gough and Simmons develop 1his interpretation when they
point to civil society as being established by a group of men
agreeing to join and combine imo a community. Having recognized the dangers of life in the state of nature, men agree to surrender in various degrees two kinds of rights on entering political society: (I) the right 'to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the
preservation of himself and 01hers within the permission of the
law of Nature' is given up to the extent that ' the preservation of
himself, and the rest of that Society shall require' (II. 128-9)
and (2) the 'power 10 punish the Crimes committed against that
Law [i.e., the Law of Nature] .. . he wholly gives up' (IT. 128
and 130). This is, more or less, what is called political power,
and it is this power 1ha1 is handed over by the contracting individuals 10 Lhe body politic. That is 10 say, once this contract is
made and society is formed, the majority have the right to act on
behalf of the rest of the members. This represents Simmons's
first logical step to a complete society, expressed by Locke
when he writes: 'Political Power is 1hat Power which every
Man, having in the Slate of Nature, has given up into the hands

128

129

76).

Unlike Pollock, however, Gtanl underscores a prac1ical probltm that arises from
lhis tcrmin:,logical cJistinc1ion: wt1e1her politicaJ SO<.iciy can exist without a designated
form o( goYcmment long enough for the nuijori1y 10 create a new one (op. cit.. p.
105). Can the community funccion a.s n unit in 1.he way th:i.1 government Functions?
Since Lt>cke argues th;u people in $0C!c1y have the liberty to erect a new legi.slature
when govcmmet11 has been dissolved. and that it is only through this liberty that
socie1y c.-in preserve itself, he ~ms 10 suggest 1ha1politicaJ society is nm viable in its
b:.isic dcmocr.11ic form. In other words. Grant is not persuaded that 1he majority of a
communit) can act in the wa)' that government can act in order to maintain society by
rtSOlving, disputes among its members (ibid., p. 106).
10 Some oommen1a1ors understand the I).(; Theory as involving a two-Slage
agreemc.n1. For example, Pol!oct interprets Locke as saying thai one stage establishes
political socie«y and another sets up government (Pollock, toe. cil.). The first stage is
an agteement be1ween cenain individuals to live in a oornmo,,weahh (pac1u1t1
union/.\'). h is only after this s1agc has bc.:t:n completed that tl1c second stage oc:curs,
thal i.s, when the insti1utions of the c<>mmonwc.alth obtain their form by the placement
o( power in the hands of those dcsigna1cd by the people of the. society (puctum swb-

jrctionis).
L. J. Ma.cfatlane also suggests 1his interprtlatton when he s1ates: 'All that each
and e\!try individual does in his initial common act of consent is to enter society on

IV: The Contract-Trust Theory

of the Society' (JI. 171),17 It is at this juncture that talk of
government2 arises, for the first act of the community is the
establishment of government2 in the guise of the legislative
power (II. 212).18 This is Simmons's second logical step in the
formation of a complete society.19 But whether we are talking
about the relations of a king to his people or of a parliament to
those it represents, there is no contract between government and
the people. Rather, as Gough and Simmons note , government is
formed by society' s granting a trust, thereby encrusting
government wilh the power of the majority .20
In an ordinary legal trust, such as that set up to administer
the estate of a child, there are three different parties-truster,
trustee, and beneficiary. But what we have in the Second
Treatise is something quite different, for Locke's political trust
is a relationship between only two parties-a trustee (government2) and the truster (the people), who is also the beneficiary.21
It is the latter who determines the terms of the trust, and
11 Simm~ , Q ,r ~
he idgc <( w1archJ, p. 68. Simmons notes that the two $lcps
1ha1fonn pohhc.al $0C1cty and go\'Cmmcnt arc logically separate, though they may not
be temporally scparible.

" J. W.
19

Gough. 1/,e social mntr(lt1 (Oxford 1936). pp. 129-33.

Simmons, Joe. cit.

In John Ux:ke ',> tHJlitkul pJtil,1wphy, 2nd 1:dn. (Oxford 1973), p. 161, Gough
argues that there arc two fo nns of political trust: o ne in which the executive ac ts as
2(1

1h~ trustee for the people and anolher in which the legislalive .shoulders 1he burden of
being Lhe truMee for the cleetor:ue. lns1ances of the executive truSt ~re. found in TI.
IS3 ;rnd 11. 139. where:3$ inst3nces of the legislative trus-t are found in JI. l3S: II.

136: :md II. 139. This is reircrntcd by Gerainl Parry in Jolm lhde (London 1978),
wh~n. he says that 'Government, 10 repeaa, is not instituted hy the contract. h is the
rcc1p1en1 of a power entrusted to it for the same purpose as it was originally wielded
by th~ society it~elf-th~ p~rvation of propeny. Governmental authority is limited
by 1h1s trust and LS forfeued 1f the trust is broken' (p. 101).
ll

Pany. op. cit.. p. 124. For a detailed description of the differences between

con1tact and trust see Simmons. 011 1ht edge of anarchy, pp. 7 1-2.
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therefore, the authority or discretionary power of the trustee.
Employing the notion of trust rather than contract, as the kind of
volu ntary alienation or consent that establishes government2, has
extremely important consequences for how Locke's doctrine of
resistance relates to the moral inviolability condition.
Of course, there are nay-sayers, like John Dunn and Martin
Seliger, who quickly dismiss the importance of Locke's conception of trust as a legal or juridical trust, and instead present it as
something akin to 'trustworthiness' .22 However, arguments have
been advanced by such commentators as Ernest Barker to show
that the trust as a legal notion is an important part of Locke's
political theory. 'Locke uses the conception of Trust', Barker
writes,
and not that of Contract, to explain 'subjcc1ion'. The trust is a conccptioo
pecul iar, on the whole, to English law. In private Jaw [Privatrec/11] the
1rust means that A, as trustor, vests rights in B, as 1rustee, for 1he benefit
of C, as cestui que trust or beneficiary of the trust. In public Jaw
1Staatsrecht], 10 which Locke may be said to transfer the doclrine of
1rust, 1he People or ' Public' (which is both the trustor Md the cestui que
trust) acts in its capacity of trustor by way of conferring a 'fiduciary
power' on the legislature (which thus becomes a lruStee), for the benefit
of itself, and all its members, in its other capacity of cestui que trust or
beneficiary o f the trust."

The implication of this is not lost on Gough, for he turns to
Barker's clarifying statement on what Locke's contract-trust
distinction means for politics:

n John Dunn, 'The Co1"epc oi "trus1" in the policies of John Locke' in
0 11 1hr historiography of philosophy, ed. R. Rony ~ al.
(Cambrodge 1984). pp. 296-7 and Seliger, op. cil., p. 357.
Phifoso,!hy i11 l,ismry: EJu,yt

" E. Barker, N~tes to 0. Gierke, Natural law and th.cht0ry of s«ie,y, /5(/() I()

I~. vol. I (Cambridge 1934), p. 299. Gough acknowledges Barl<er's clarifying nole
to G1erke's wort, m John lockt.'s political philosophy, p. 155.
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A 1rus1 is not a contract; and the trustee docs not enter into relations of

contract with the truslOr-or with the beneficiary. Roughly, he may be
said to consent to incur a unilateral obligation- an obligation to the
beneficiary which, if it implies the trustee's possession and vindication of
rights against other parties on behalf of that beneficiary, implies no rights
for the trustee himself on his own behalf. If therefore political power be
regarded as a trust. it follows that the Sovereign has not entered into a
con1rac1 with the People, or the People with him-whether we regard the
People as trustor or as beneficiary of the 1rus1. The trust, in its application
to politics, leaves no room for a 'contract of subjection'.2'

This interpretation of Locke as a proponent of the C-T
Theory, it seems to me, is not only textually sound, but also
reflecls his interest in safeguarding the liberties and rights of the
people against the abuse of power by government2 • That is, it
represents the sort of institutional arrangement or practice
needed to acknowledge the moral inviolability of the individuals
of the community. Moreover, it acknowledges the basis for
resistance to governmental authority, by establishing how
governmeot2 becomes unilaterally obligated to the people i1
serves. In the evem that government2 is remiss in its obligation
10 preserve property, its constituents have the right to act
towards this end even if it means taking up arms against the
sovereign.

one contract (that is, the S-C Theory) or they are partially distinguished by means of the D·C Theory. Arguably, evidence for
both interpretations can be found in various passages in the
Second Treatise. In adopting these interpretations, however,
they not only neglect key passages of the text, but they fail to
acknowledge the insight that the C-T Theory has to offer in
interpreting the Second Treatise as a document of revolutionary
Libera lism that acknowledges the integrity of the community and
the moral inviolability of the individual. By using the notions of
contract and trust, Locke was able 10 escape through the horns
of Hobbes's dilemma, leading him to a doctrine of resistance
which allowed for an alternative other than anarchy or authoritarianism.

V: Conclusion
I have argued that while some commentators on Locke's Second
Treatise are fond of pointing out the consensual foundations of
political society and government, they fail to note the differences
between the two institutions. Political society and government
are either lumped together and their origin acknowledged to be
24

B:.uker. ibid. Gougll (l'JOICS pan or the passage in Thr sodul ,:ontroc1, p. 134.
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